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The Paris Agreement and Global Climate 
Litigation after the Trump Withdrawal 
DAVID HUNTER, WENHUI JI & JENNA RUDDOCK†  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When President Trump announced his intention to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement,1 it re-confirmed that the U.S. federal 
government is not a reliable player in global efforts to combat climate 
change.2 Other national governments, U.S. state and local 
governments, private sector leaders and environmental organizations 
all voiced their frustration.3  More generally, the United States’ 
reversal was a reminder that the world’s response to climate change 
should not be hostage to the whims of the political branches of 
government.  Government regulators, who operate with a relatively 
short time horizon and are frequently captured by the regulated 
community, need to be monitored and sometimes prodded by an 
engaged judiciary. 
 
© 2018 David Hunter, Wenhui Ji, Jenna Ruddock 
         † David Hunter is Professor of Law at American University Washington College of 
Law. He specializes in international and comparative environmental law. Wenhui Ji received 
her JD from Vermont Law School in 2017 and is currently an LLM candidate in 
International Law at American University Washington College of Law. Jenna Ruddock is a 
JD candidate at American University Washington College of Law interested in 
environmental and human rights law. 
 1. For the Paris Agreement, see G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agree- 
ment]. 
 2.  Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-ag 
reement.html. 
 3.  Nadja Popovich & Tatiana Schlossberg, How Cities and States Reacted to Trump’s 
Decision to Exit the Paris Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/2017/06/02/climate/trump-paris-mayors.html. 
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        The emergence of climate-related litigation in the United States 
and abroad pre-dates the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement, but that withdrawal underscored the need for 
judicial engagement.  Climate-related litigation now includes many 
different approaches and legal theories.4  Some cases aim to hold 
fossil fuel companies liable for damages for injuries attributable to 
climate change.5  Some cases aim to ensure climate change is taken 
into account in planning decisions or in financial disclosures.6  More 
commonly, claims aim at strengthening a government’s approach to 
mitigating climate change either generally or with respect to a 
specific project.  Particularly in these latter cases, the Paris 
Agreement is playing a critical and somewhat surprising role—given 
that by its terms it creates no internationally binding mitigation 
requirement.7  
This article explores the ways in which litigants and courts 
around the world are invoking the Paris Agreement to push for a 
stronger response to climate change.  This article focuses on two 
general categories of litigation where the Paris Agreement is playing, 
or is likely to play, a vital role: (1) litigation aimed at strengthening 
governments’ climate change mitigation efforts (notwithstanding the 
well-known non-binding nature of the mitigation commitments under 
the Paris Agreement);8 and (2) litigation involving financial 
disclosure and investment expectations of the fossil fuel industry.9 
The Paris Agreement’s mitigation commitments are not necessarily 
being enforced directly, but the Agreement’s mitigation framework, 
including the particular Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), mid- and long-term goals and the temperature targets, 
provides a policy and factual benchmark against which courts are 
 
 4.  A recent United Nations report identified 654 climate-related cases in the United 
States and 230 others in 24 countries worldwide.  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME THE STATUS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL REVIEW 10–11 (2017) [hereinafter UNEP 
Climate Litigation Report]; see also Jeffrey Williamson, As Climate Lawsuits Grow 
Worldwide, Legal Strategies Evolve Too, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/12/26/legal-strategy-climate-lawsuits/.   
 5.  See, e.g., Dana Drugmand, Courts Will Play Key Role in Addressing Climate Crisis, 
Experts Say, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews. 
org/2018/09/27/climate-crisis-litigation-columbia/ (summarizing tort-based litigation to 
recover the costs of addressing climate change).   
 6.  See UNEP Climate Litigation Report, supra note 4, at 14; Geetanjali Ganguly, 
Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for 
Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 841, 860 (2018). 
 7.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(19). 
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 35-107. 
 9.  See infra text accompanying notes 108-31. 
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evaluating government or private sector actions.10  The Paris 
Agreement’s utility in litigation thus extends beyond the legal nature 
of its mitigation commitments.  As a result, although other obstacles 
to climate litigation exist in the United States, President Trump’s 
announced withdrawal may not significantly lessen the value of the 
Paris Agreement to judicial review even here in the United States.  
After a brief summary of the Paris Agreement’s approach to 
climate mitigation,11 Parts II to IV of this article survey the use of the 
Agreement in cases evaluating the government’s approach  to climate 
change mitigation under national law,12 international human rights 
law,13 and international environmental law.14  Part V analyzes the 
signaling effect of the Paris Agreement in shaping cases involving 
financial disclosure and investment-backed expectations of the fossil 
fuel industry.15  The conclusion briefly considers the potential impact 
of the Trump withdrawal on the Paris Agreement’s litigation role.16 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S APPROACH TO 
CLIMATE MITIGATION  
The 2015 Paris Agreement was celebrated as a major advance in 
the world’s efforts to address climate change, in particular because 
for the first time all countries agreed to take steps to mitigate or 
prevent climate change.17  The Paris Agreement sits within the 
framework established by the 1992 United Nations Framework on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).18  Under the UNFCCC, the objective of 
global cooperation in climate negotiations is to “prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference” (known as (DAI), which is defined in 
terms of avoiding significant damage to natural ecosystems, food 
security and economic development).19  To meet the objective of 
avoiding DAI, the Paris Agreement sets the overall mitigation target 
“to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
 
 10.  See infra text accompanying notes 35-47. 
 11.  See infra text accompanying notes 17-34. 
 12.  See infra text accompanying notes 35-47. 
 13.  See infra text accompanying notes 48-90. 
 14.  See infra text accompanying notes 91-107. 
 15.  See infra text accompanying notes 108-31. 
 16.  See infra text accompanying notes 132-34. 
 17. See Historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 195 Nations Set Path to Keep 
Temperature Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius, UNFCCC (Dec. 13, 2014), https://unfccc. 
int/news/finale-cop21. 
 18.   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 19.  Id. art. 2. 
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2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing 
that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate 
change.”20  The 2°C temperature goal reflects the governments’ 
consensus of the maximum temperature rise that would give the 
world a reasonable chance of avoiding significant harm from climate 
change.  The Parties also recognized that this goal might be 
insufficient, and thus agreed to “pursue efforts” to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C.  
Rather than negotiating a carbon budget with binding national 
targets and timetables aimed at meeting the temperature goal, each 
country was invited to announce their own nationally determined 
mitigation actions in the run-up and during the Paris negotiations.21   
The resulting NDCs comprise each country’s primary commitments 
to help prevent climate change under the Paris Agreement 
framework.22  As of March 2019, one-hundred-eighty-two countries 
had formally announced an NDC in support of the overall objectives 
of the Agreement.23   
Despite near universal participation in adopting NDCs, by all 
accounts the cumulative pledges fall significantly short of the total 
emissions reductions needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s 2°C 
goal and by implication the UNFCCC’s objective to avoid DAI.24  
Although estimates vary, according to the United Nations, fully 
implementing the current NDCs would meet only one-third of the 
necessary emissions reductions.25     
The Parties anticipated that the initial NDCs would leave such 
an “emissions gap” and established a process for increasing NDCs 
over time.26 The Parties agreed to review their NDCs and 
communicate “successive” NDCs every five years, beginning in 
2020.27 The Parties are not allowed to backslide on their 
 
 20.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 21.  See UNFCCC, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), https://unfccc.int/pro 
cess/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions/ndc-registry (last visited Mar. 
28, 2019) [hereinafter NDC Registry]; see also Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(2). 
 22. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a).  
 23. For a list of NDCs submitted pursuant to the Paris Agreement, see NDC Registry, 
supra note 21. 
 24.  The United Nations issues an annual report assessing progress on the Nationally 
Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement. See, e.g., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 (2018). 
 25.  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2017, at xiv (2017). 
 26.  Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4. 
 27.  Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(9); see also Framework Convention on 
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commitments.  Each Party’s successive NDC should “represent a 
progression beyond the Party’s then current [NDC] … and reflect its 
highest possible ambition.”28  In addition, the Parties also signaled 
their long-term resolve to move the world beyond fossil fuels to a low 
carbon future.  The Paris Agreement endorses a “global peaking” of 
GHG emissions “as soon as possible” and commits countries to 
“rapid reductions thereafter … so as to achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.”29  To 
operationalize these long-term goals, the Parties should submit “mid-
century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development 
strategies” by 2020.30  
Although the Paris Agreement is a binding international 
agreement, the Parties carefully crafted the language for the NDCs 
and other mitigation commitments to ensure that the specific 
commitments were not binding as a matter of international law.31  The 
Agreement does not contemplate any legal process for enforcing or 
compelling a Party to implement their NDC.  Nor does the Paris 
Agreement explicitly create or require any cause of action to enforce 
the NDC under national law.  The soft law, non-binding nature of the 
NDCs was a condition for gaining U.S. support for the Agreement.32 
The non-binding nature of the NDCs may be less important than it 
initially seems.  The Paris Agreement contemplates a harmonized 
“rulebook” that sets forth a transparent system to allow the 
international community to track and evaluate implementation of the  
 
 
 
 
 
Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, ¶¶ 23–
24, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) (the Parties request a new NDC 
from those having 2025 as their target date and only urge a new NDC in 2020 from those 
having 2030 as a target date) [hereinafter Report of the Paris CoP]. 
 28.  Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(3). 
 29.  Id. art. 4(1). 
 30.  Report of the Paris CoP, supra note 27, ¶ 35; see also Paris Agreement supra note 
1, art. 4(19). 
 31. Paris Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un. 
org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-paris-agreement-faqs/ (last visited Mar. 29, 
2019). 
 32.  Erika Rosenthal, Paris Climate Agreement: A Good Deal for the United States. An 
Essential Deal for the Planet, EARTH JUSTICE (Mar. 29, 2019), https://earthjustice.org/featur 
es/paris-agreement. 
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commitments.33  More to the point, national courts in several 
countries are enforcing, or otherwise invoking, the Paris Agreement 
in evaluating the adequacy of climate mitigation efforts.34  
III. ENFORCING THE NDCS  
Although the Paris Agreement’s non-binding treatment of NDCs 
clearly avoids state-to-state enforcement under international law, as 
this section demonstrates a country’s NDC may nonetheless be 
enforceable as a matter of national law.  National courts may be 
enlisted to review the adequacy of NDCs, progress in their 
implementation, or the consistency of proposed activities with their 
NDCs.   
In New Zealand, for example, Susan Thomson, a law student, 
sought judicial review of the adequacy of New Zealand’s NDC 
primarily based on administrative law requirements.35  The High 
Court of New Zealand rejected the government’s arguments opposing 
judicial review, finding that the urgency of climate change required 
judicial scrutiny over what might otherwise be considered a strictly 
political issue.36  The Court held that the government acted 
unlawfully when it failed to review its 2050 mitigation target to 
reflect advancements in climate science.37  As a matter of national 
law, the Court required the government to review its long-term target 
whenever the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
issued a new report.38  The Court ultimately deferred its review of the 
adequacy of the NDC in part because an incoming government had 
announced it would review the NDC within a year.39   
 
 33.  The Parties made significant progress in negotiating the rulebook in the 2018 
Conference of the Parties. See Success of COP24 – We Have the Katowice Rulebook, COP24-
KATOWICE 2018 (Dec. 15, 2018), https://cop24.gov.pl/news/news-details/news/success-of-
cop24-in-katowice-we-have-a-global-climate-agreement/. 
 34.  See infra text accompanying notes 35-47. 
 35.  Rebecca Macfie, New Zealand’s first climate change lawsuit rejected by High 
Court, NOTED (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.noted.co.nz/planet/new-zealand-s-first-climate-
change-lawsuit-rejected-by-high-court/. 
 36.  The Court first rejected the government’s argument that the adequacy of its climate 
targets involved balancing many socioeconomic factors and were thus “political”. The Court 
also rejected the government’s argument that because the NDCs were made pursuant to an 
international agreement, the courts should not intervene in the executive branch’s exercise of 
its foreign relations authority. Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues [2017] NZHC 
733 [¶¶ 133–134] per Mallon J (N.Z.) [hereinafter Thomson v. New Zealand]. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  ¶¶ 93–98. 
 39.  Id. 
HUNTER  
230 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:7 
In Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment has announced a 
suit against the government claiming that the country’s 2017 National 
Mitigation Plan is inadequate, as it would result in Ireland exceeding 
its equitable share of the global carbon budget implicit in the Paris 
Agreement.40  The suit also alleges violations of the Climate Act, the 
Irish Constitution, and human rights obligations.41  The case was not 
decided as of March 2019.42  
The Paris Agreement has also been invoked against specific 
projects that are arguably either inconsistent with NDCs or have not 
been adequately assessed in light of their NDC.  In 2017, for 
example, the South African High Court for North Gauteng 
invalidated the approval of a proposed coal-fired power plant because 
the environmental assessment had not included an assessment of 
climate change impacts. 43  The Court noted that South Africa’s NDC 
under the Paris Agreement contemplated growth in carbon emissions 
from coal-fired power plants, but found that climate change impacts 
must nonetheless be considered in permitting new plants:   
The respondents further argued that the power station 
project is consistent with South Africa’s NDC under 
the Paris Agreement, which envisages that South 
Africa’s emissions will peak between 2020 and 2025.  
Again, I agree with Earthlife that this contention 
misses the point. The argument is not whether new 
coal-fired power stations are permitted under the Paris 
Agreement and the NDC.  The narrow question is 
whether a climate change impact assessment is 
required before authorising new coal-fired power 
stations.  A climate change impact assessment is 
necessary and relevant to ensuring that the proposed 
coal-fired power station fits South Africa’s peak,  
 
 
 
 
 40.  As of January 2019, the pleadings in the case have not been made public but the 
action is described at the Friends of the Irish Environment’s website. See CLIMATE CASE 
IRELAND, https://www.climatecaseireland.ie/climate-case/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  EarthLife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs [2017] 65662/16 2 
(High Ct. of S. Afr., Gauteng Division, Pretoria) [hereinafter EarthLife v. South Africa]; see 
also Leonie Joubert, Court Stalls New Coal Plan in South Africa, ENERGY TRANSITION: THE  
GLOBAL ENERGIEWENDE (Oct. 10, 2017), https://energytransition.org/2017/10/court-stalls-
new-sa-coal-mega-station/.  
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plateau and decline trajectory as outlined in the NDC 
and its commitment to build cleaner and more efficient 
than existing power stations.44 
        The South African decision referenced the NDC as the 
framework against which to evaluate climate-related decisions even 
though South Africa had yet to enact the Paris Agreement into 
domestic law.45   
In another example, an Australian court recently cited 
inconsistency with Australia’s commitment to the goals of the Paris 
Agreement as one of the arguments for denying a permit for a new 
coal mine.46  The Court held: 
The Project will be a material source of GHG 
emissions and contribute to climate change.  Approval 
of the Project will not assist in achieving the rapid and 
deep reductions in GHG emissions that are needed 
now in order to balance emissions by sources with 
removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of this 
century and achieve the generally agreed goal of 
limiting the increase in global average temperature to 
well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. . .  
 
In short, an open cut coal mine in this part of the 
Gloucester valley would be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time.  Wrong place because an open cut coal 
mine in this scenic and cultural landscape, proximate 
to many people’s homes and farms, will cause 
significant planning, amenity, visual and social 
impacts.  Wrong time because the GHG emissions of 
the coal mine and its coal product will increase global 
total concentrations of GHGs at a time when what is 
now urgently needed, in order to meet generally 
agreed climate targets, is a rapid and deep decrease in 
GHG emissions.  These dire consequences should be 
avoided. The Project should be refused.47 
 
 
 44.  EarthLife v. South Africa, supra note 43, ¶ 90. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Gloucester Resources Ltd. v. Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7 (Feb. 8, 
2019). 
 47.  Id. ¶¶ 697-699 (emphasis added). 
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The Australian court thus used the temperature and longer term goals 
of the Paris Agreement as a benchmark against which to measure the 
government’s actions in denying the coal mine permit. 
The judicial review of NDCs by national courts like New 
Zealand may not be so surprising to the extent that the NDCs are 
enacted as part of national law.  Perhaps more surprising is the South 
African and Australian courts’ use of the Paris Agreement’s overall 
mitigation framework, including the temperature targets and the mid- 
and long-term mitigation goals.  These courts do not rely on the Paris 
Agreement as setting a binding legal standard, but rather as a 
“generally agreed” benchmark for evaluating government decisions 
relating to climate change.  This is the same approach being taken in 
climate change cases relying on international human rights law, as 
discussed below.   
IV. THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES  
For many years now, human rights advocates have warned that, 
if left unchecked, climate change would lead to significant violations 
of human rights.48  A stable climate system, and by implication, the 
destruction of a stable climate system, have been linked not only to a 
right to a healthy environment, but also to the rights to life, family, 
water, housing, and food, among others.49  The UNFCCC objective of 
DAI explicitly references the need to avoid socioeconomic impacts 
on food security and economic development.50  As a result, if a 
country fails to meet the objective under the UNFCCC, they are also 
failing to prevent violations of associated human rights.  Put another 
 
 48.  See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Human rights and climate change ¶1, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/35/L.32 (June 19, 2017); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human 
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment ¶¶ 23-39, 65, 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (Feb. 1, 2016) (noting that the “. . . 
greater the increase in average temperature, the greater the effects on the right to life and 
health. . .”) [hereinafter “Report on the Issue of Human Rights Relating to the 
Environment”]; see also Joint statement by UN Special Procedures on the occasion of World 
Environment Day, U.N. OFFICE OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (June 5, 2015), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16049&LangID=
E (reiterating that “an average increase in global temperature of even 2.0°C will adversely 
affect a wide range of human rights, including the rights to life …”); Rep. of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate 
Change and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://undocs.org 
/A/HRC/10/61 [hereinafter OHCHR]. 
 49.   See OHCHR, supra note 48, ¶¶ 20-41; see also David Hunter, Human Rights for 
Climate Change Implications, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 331 (2009). 
 50.  UNFCCC, supra note 18, art. 2. 
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way, determinations of what collectively countries must do to meet 
the UNFCCC obligation also reflects what countries collectively 
must do at a minimum to reach a safe level of emissions for 
protecting human rights.  
As noted above, the NDCs under the Paris Agreement leave us 
cumulatively well short of achieving the 2°C temperature goal, let 
alone the more ambitious 1.5°C goal.51  The Paris Agreement’s 
temperature goal reflects a determination that holding temperatures 
“well below 2°C” is necessary to avoid impacts beyond DAI under 
the climate regime.52  Estimates suggest that the current NDCs, if 
fulfilled, would allow an estimated increase in global average 
temperatures of 3.3°C.53  Such a temperature increase would, among 
other things, threaten food security, create severe water shortages, 
cause fatalities from extreme heat, and leave millions of individuals 
displaced by sea level rise and increased frequency of extreme 
weather events.54  This result threatens the realization of basic human 
rights.  Although the meeting the Paris Agreement goals may not be 
sufficient to protect human rights from the impact from the impact of 
climate change, attaining them is certainly a minimum step forward 
from the status quo. 
Viewed in this light, the Paris Agreement helps to define what 
temperature goal and by implication what mitigation efforts are at a 
minimum to protect the “right to life” or the right to a “healthy 
environment.”  In the past few years, human rights advocates have 
increasingly incorporated the science-based, political consensus of 
the Paris Agreement, particularly its temperature goals, in asking 
courts to review their country’s respective efforts to protect 
internationally or nationally recognized individual rights against the 
threats posed by climate change.  The leading case taking this  
 
 
 
 51.  Facilitating Global Transition: The Role of National Determined Contributions in 
Meeting the Long-term Temperature Goal of the Paris Agreement, NDC PARTNERSHIP 
http://ndcpartnership.org/facilitating-global-transition-role-nationally-determined-
contributions-meeting-long-term, (last visited Mar 30, 2019). 
 52.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. (“In furtherance of the objective of the 
Convention”), art. 2(1) (“in enhancing implementation of the Convention, including its 
objective”). 
 53.  See Increase in Global Temperature by 2100, CLIMATE INTERACTIVE SCOREBOARD, 
https://img.climateinteractive.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Scoreboard-static-clean-
Apr5.png (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 54.  See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMER 
WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED, at xvi (2012).  
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approach is Urgenda v. Netherlands, in which an appellate court has 
upheld a rights-based challenge claiming the Netherlands’ 
commitments to mitigate climate change are insufficient.55 
A. Urgenda v. Netherlands   
In Urgenda, a Dutch environmental group sued the Netherlands 
government for its inadequate action to prevent serious 
environmental and health risks from climate change, which Urgenda 
alleged violated the government’s obligation to protect its citizens’ 
rights to life and to family life under the European Convention of 
Human Rights.56  The plaintiffs sought to compel the government to 
impose more stringent restrictions on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions than currently contemplated.57  The plaintiffs specifically 
cited the Dutch government’s decision to significantly scale back its 
previous commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.58  Until 
2011, the Netherlands had promoted a thirty percent reduction from 
1990 levels by 2020, but political considerations led the Netherlands 
to reduce its commitment by the time of the lawsuit to seventeen 
percent.59  The plaintiffs challenged the lack of scientific support for 
lowering the Dutch commitment and argued that the government had 
failed to fulfill its obligation toward the plaintiffs.60  In 2015, the 
Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiffs.  The court ordered 
the government to reduce emissions at least twenty-five percent from 
1990 levels, while leaving the choice of reduction methods to the 
government.61 
 
 
 
 55.  Hof Den Haag 9 Oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. Van G.A., Van der Veen en 
Ch.W. Backes (De Staat Der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda 
App. Dec.]. 
 56. See Rechtbank Den Haag, 24 Juni 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2591 (Stichting 
Urgenda/De Staat Der Nederlanden) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda Lower Ct. Dec.]; see also 
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Environment, ETS 
No. 005, Arts. 2, 8 (1950) [hereinafter ECHR]; see generally Eleanor Stein & Alex Geert 
Castermans, Comment, Urgenda v. The State of the Netherlands: The “Reflex Effect” – 
Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Expanding Definitions of the Duty of Care, 13 
MCGILL J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 303, 305 (2017); Josephine van Zeben, Establishing a 
Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?, 4 
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 339, 341 (2015). 
 57.  Urgenda App. Dec, supra note 55.  
 58.  Stein & Castermans, supra note 56; van Zeben, supra note 56. 
 59.  Urgenda Lower Ct. Dec., supra note 56. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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In upholding the appeal, the Hague Court of Appeal relied in 
part on the Paris Agreement (negotiated after the lower court’s 
opinion was issued) in defining the Netherlands’ duty of care.62  The 
Court first reviewed the potential impacts of climate change, finding 
that there is: “a real threat of dangerous climate change, resulting in 
the serious risk that the current generation of citizens will be 
confronted with loss of life and/or a disruption of family life . . .[I]t 
follows from Articles 2 and 8 [of the] ECHR that the State has a duty 
to protect against this real threat.”63  Having rooted the legal 
obligation in the human rights to life (Article 2) and to family life 
(Article 8) under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the question remained as to what level of care would meet 
the State’s obligation to protect these rights.  The Court found the 
answer at least partly in the Paris Agreement.  The Court noted the 
Netherlands had committed in the Paris Agreement to keeping the 
global rise in temperature “well below” the 2o C limit and that a 
‘safe’ temperature rise should not exceed 1.5oC.64  In order to achieve 
these levels, the Court noted that the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases could not exceed four hundred and fifty and four 
hundred and thirty ppm, respectively.65  The Court used these 
references to conclude that at least a twenty-five to forty percent 
reduction of CO2 is not an “overly pessimistic starting point[] for 
establishing the State’s duty of care.”66  
The Court traced the long negotiating process that led to the 
Paris Agreement and reflected on the Netherlands approach to 
reduction target over the years.  The Court found that: 
The State has known about the reduction target of 
twenty-five to forty percent for a long time.  The IPCC 
report which states that such a reduction by end-2020 
is needed to achieve the 2oC target (AR4) dates back 
to 2007. Since that time, virtually all COPs (in Bali, 
Cancun, Durban, Doha and Warsaw) have referred to 
this twenty-five to forty percent standard and Annex I 
countries have been urged to align their reduction 
targets accordingly.  This may not have established a 
legal standard with a direct effect, but the Court 
believes that it confirms the fact that at least a twenty-
 
 62.  Urgenda App. Dec., supra note 55. 
 63.  Id. ¶ 45. 
 64.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. ¶ 50. 
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five to forty percent reduction of CO2 emissions as of 
2020 is required to prevent dangerous climate 
change.67 
Based on this analysis, the Court held that the State’s duty of 
care to protect the rights of its citizens required the State to reduce its 
emissions by at least twenty-five percent from 1990 levels by the end 
of 2020.68  Interestingly, the State did not hold that the Paris 
Agreement created a legally binding obligation.  Rather, the Paris 
Agreement’s temperature goals, as well as the science underlying 
those goals, were used as evidence of a generally accepted minimum 
level of action necessary to meet a legal obligation rooted in the 
ECHR.69  
B. Other Rights-based Cases 
Urgenda has inspired a number of youth groups to explore 
similar rights-based challenges to their country’s climate-related 
policies.  For example, in Colombia twenty-five young plaintiffs 
alleged that deforestation rates violated their human rights under the 
1991 Colombian Constitution, including rights to a healthy 
environment, life, food and water.70  In April 2018, the Colombian 
Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favor of the plaintiffs who 
challenged the government’s failure to prevent accelerating rates of 
deforestation in the Amazon basin.71  Like the outcome in the 
Urgenda case, the Colombian court mandated that the government 
 
 67.  Id. ¶ 51. 
 68.  Id. ¶ 76. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Civil abril 5, 
2018, M.P.: Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona, STC4360-2018, Radicación No. 11001-22-03-
0000-2018-00319-01 (Colom.) [hereinafter Barragán, C.S.J. Dec.]; see also Ucilia Wang, 
Colombian Court Orders Government to Stop Deforestation, Protect Climate, CLIMATE 
LIABILITY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/04/05/colombia-
amazon-climate-change-deforestation/. Similarly, in Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, a 
farmer sued the national government for failure to carry out the 2012 National Climate 
Policy and Framework. Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore 
High Ct.) (2015) (Pak.). The Lahore High Court ruled that “Climate Change is a defining 
challenge of our time and has led to dramatic alterations in our planet’s climate system . . .  
[O]n a legal and constitutional plane this is a clarion call for the protection of fundamental 
rights of the citizens of Pakistan.” Id. ¶ 6. The court found that “the delay and lethargy of the 
State in implementing the Framework offend the fundamental rights of the citizens.” Id. ¶ 8.  
Accordingly, the court created a twenty-one-member Climate Change Commission to help 
ensure implementation of the climate laws. See id. ¶ 8. 
 71.  Anastasia Moloney, Colombia’s Top Court Orders Government to Protect Amazon 
Forest in Landmark Case, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
colombia-deforestation-amazon/colombias-top-court-orders-government-to-protect-amazon-
forest-in-landmark-case-idUSKCN1HD21Y. 
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take action in the near future, without specifying exactly what 
measures would be sufficient.72  The Court also declared the Amazon 
to be an “entity subject of rights,”73 extensively referencing the 
importance of the Amazon basin to achieving Colombia’s 
international climate change commitments, including those set under 
the Paris Agreement. 
Inspired by Urgenda and other youth-based lawsuits, a group of 
elderly Swiss women sued their government arguing that Switzerland 
was not on an emissions reduction trajectory consistent with the Paris 
Agreement’s 2ºC temperature goal.74  This failure, they alleged, was 
also a failure to meet the State’s obligation to prevent violations of 
articles 10 (right to life), 73 (sustainability principle), and 74 
(precautionary principle) of the Swiss Constitution and by articles 2 
(right to life) and 8 (right to family life) of the ECHR.75  They asked 
the government to work towards achieving greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions of at least twenty-five percent below 1990 levels by 2020 
and at least fifty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.76  In November 
2018, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court dismissed the claim, 
finding that the elderly plaintiffs were not particularly vulnerable 
from climate change and thus had no justiciable claims different than 
that of the general public.77  
C.  The Rights-based Approach in the United States:  Juliana v. 
United States  
To highlight the impacts of climate change on future 
generations,78 twenty-one children and young adults filed suit against 
the federal government, alleging that the U.S. government has failed  
 
 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Request to Stop Emissions in Climate Protection Pursuant to Art. 25(a) APA 
and Art. 6 ¶ 1 and 13 ECHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Federal Council (Oct. 25, 
2016), https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Gesuch-um-Erlass-Verfuegu 
ng_Sperrfrist.pdf (Switz.). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGE] [Federal Administrative Court] Nov. 27, 2018, 
A-2992/2017, https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Scan_urteil-BvG_20 
180512.pdf (Switz.). 
 78. See First Amended Complaint, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. 
Or. Sept. 10, 2015) (No.: 6:15-cv-01517-TC) [hereinafter Juliana Complaint].  For all of the 
major filings in the case, see OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/ 
juliana-v-us. 
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to enact climate change policies that would adequately protect their 
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property, as well as public 
trust resources.79   
The plaintiffs alleged that despite knowing “for decades” that 
GHG emissions contributed to climate change, the federal 
government has “continued to permit, authorize, and subsidize fossil 
fuel extraction, development, consumption and exportation,” 
including on federal land.80  The complaint states claims for 
violations of several constitutional principles, including the due 
process clause and equal protection principles of the Fifth 
Amendment and certain unenumerated rights in the Ninth 
Amendment, as well as for violation of the public trust doctrine.81  As 
redress for these violations, the complaint requests the defendants 
cease “permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing” fossil fuels and to 
develop and implement a “national plan,” which would include 
limiting the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide to three 
hundred and fifty parts-per-million by the year 2100.82  
In a remarkable decision, District Court Judge Aiken recognized 
“the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is 
fundamental to a free and ordered society.”83  As the court held in 
2016 and reaffirmed in 2018: 
where a complaint alleges knowing governmental 
action is affirmatively and substantially damaging the 
climate system in a way that will cause human deaths, 
shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage 
to property, threaten human food sources, and 
dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a 
claim for a due process violation.  To hold otherwise 
would be to say that the Constitution affords no  
 
 
 
 79.  Juliana Complaint, supra note 78, ¶¶ 277-309.  See generally Gabriela Steier, No 
Ordinary Lawsuit: Juliana v. United States is a Landmark Precedent for Climate Change 
Legislation, JURIST (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2017/01/gabriela-
steier-juliana-v-united-states/; Rick Reibstein, Can Our Children Trust Us with Their 
Future? Juliana is a Reminder That the Government’s Purpose is to be a Guardian for 
Future Generations, A.B.A. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_ 
lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/environmental-law/can-our-children-trust-us-their-future. 
 80. Juliana Complaint, supra note 78, ¶¶ 5-7. 
 81.  Id. ¶¶ 277-309. 
 82.  Id. ¶ 310.   
 83.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) [hereinafter 
“Juliana I”]. 
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protection against a government’s knowing decision to 
poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its 
citizens drink.84 
The Court found that the plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to 
develop their claim through discovery.   
The plaintiffs in Juliana chose not to rely on the Paris 
Agreement temperature goals in defining what steps they sought the 
government to take, in part because they view the 2oC target as too 
high to ensure a stable climate system.85  The structure of the 
argument is largely the same as in Urgenda, but the Juliana plaintiffs 
seek to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at three hundred 
and fifty ppm by 2100 (more ambitious and scientifically defensible 
than the four hundred and fifty ppm associated with the 2oC under the 
Paris Agreement).86   
Notwithstanding whether the 2oC goal is sufficient, the 
reasoning in Urgenda and similar cases could still help inform the 
analysis in Juliana.  To some extent, the fact that the world, including 
the United States, has reached a scientifically based political 
consensus on the temperature goal of climate mitigation relieves the 
U.S. court from having to reach its own decision of how much 
mitigation is enough.  Like the courts in South Africa and Australia,87 
the court can accept that consensus as a minimum benchmark against 
which to measure U.S. actions, thus narrowing the political nature of 
the decisions facing the court.  Moreover, the Trump 
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not 
change the fact that a scientifically supported political consensus has 
“generally agreed” to the goal of avoiding DAI (and by implication 
disruption of basic rights) requires limiting temperature increases to 
well below” 2oC.    
The Trump Administration strongly opposed the District Court 
decision and took unprecedented steps to avoid the trial.  After 
initially failing to have the case certified for an interlocutory appeal, 
the Administration filed an unprecedented number of petitions for 
mandamus, including to the U.S. Supreme Court.88  Because these 
 
 84.  Id.; Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1098 (D. Or. 2018) [hereinafter 
“Juliana II”]. In its holding, the Court also rejected the government’s efforts to block the 
case on political question grounds and on standing. 
 85.  Juliana Complaint, supra note 78, ¶ 4. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
 88.  See, e,g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Lets Youth’s Case Demanding Climate 
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efforts continued to delay the trial, the District Court certified the 
case for an interlocutory appeal,89 and the Ninth Circuit agreed on 
December 26, 2018, to hear the appeal.90   
V. CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A different approach, one rooted in international environmental 
law, has been taken in a recent petition before the European Court of 
Justice.  In Armando Ferrão Carvalho, et al. v. The European 
Parliament and the Council, the plaintiffs alleged that the European 
Parliament and Council have failed to take adequate steps to limit 
GHG emissions.91  In addition to rights-based claims patterned after 
Urgenda, the plaintiffs argued that the European Union was failing to 
avoid transboundary environmental harm caused by climate change.92  
The plaintiffs argue that the EU has violated its obligations under the 
Paris Agreement and under customary international environmental 
law to “do no harm” to States or areas outside of their jurisdiction. 93 
According to the plaintiffs (some of whom are not EU 
residents), the EU Member States have the obligation to prevent 
significant harm to the population and environment of other states or 
areas beyond national jurisdiction.”94  They rely on the “do no harm” 
principle, which was first applied in the environmental context in the 
1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration.95  In that case, the United States 
sought to enjoin a lead smelter located in Trail, British Columbia, 
from further polluting the air within the United States.96  The 
arbitration panel ruled that international law recognizes each 
country’s sovereign right to use its territory as it chooses, but not in a 
manner that harms another State’s environment.97  The United 
 
Action Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/us/ 
politics/supreme-court-youth-climate-case.html; Karen Savage, Ninth Circuit Pauses Kids 
Climate Suit to Hear Latest Government Appeal, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/11/08/ninth-circuit-kids-climate-suit-appeal/. 
 89.  Order, Juliana v. United States, Case No.: 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or., Nov. 21, 
2018) (certifying interlocutory appeal). 
 90.  Order, Juliana v. United States, Case No.: 18-80176 (9th Cir., Dec. 26, 2018) 
(granting interlocutory appeal). 
 91.  Application for Annulment ¶¶ 137–140, Armando Ferrão Carvalho & Others v. 
Parliament & Council, Case T-330-18 (filed May 24, 2018). 
 92.  Id. ¶¶ 206-207. 
 93.  Id. ¶¶ 287-289. 
 94.  Id. ¶ 137. 
 95.  See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (Arb. Trib. 
1941).   
 96.  Id. at 1945, 1965. 
 97.  Id. at 1965 (“[N]o State has the right to use of permit the use of its territory in such 
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Nations endorsed the principle in both the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations.98  The International Court of Justice in Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of  Nuclear Weapons, subsequently found 
that “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond national control is now a part of the 
corpus of international law relating to the environment.”99 
The plaintiffs in Carvalho recognize that the do no-harm 
principle is not absolute but requires identifying the contours of the 
State’s duty of care. Citing the International Court of Justice, the 
plaintiffs framed this standard as follows:  “A State is thus obliged to 
use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take 
place in its territory or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing 
significant damage to the environment of another State.”100  The 
Petitioners argue that the degree of care required is proportional to 
the risk that is involved.101  Citing the catastrophic hazards posed by 
climate change “. . . the duty of care is particularly demanding. It 
requires as a minimum that states must take all measures of which 
they are technically and economically capable.”102 
In the climate change context, petitioners argue that the Paris 
Agreement lends specificity to the general duty of care.  The 
petitioners argue that the 2°C target in the Paris Agreement  
“formulates a clear upper limit that must be regarded as binding hard 
law in an obligation of result, not only of conduct.”  The Petitioners 
contend:  
 
 
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or 
persons therein, when the case if of serious consequence and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 98.  U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
 99.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶¶ 29–30, 241–242 (July 8) (emphasis added); see also Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C. J. Rep. 135, ¶¶ 68, 193 (Apr. 20), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/135; The Indus Waters Kishenganga (India v. Pak.), 31 U.N. 
Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1, ¶¶ 448–449 (Indus Waters Treaty Ct. of Arb. 2013), 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXXI/1-358.pdf (referring to the rule in Trail Smelter as a 
“foundational principle of customary international environmental law”). 
 100.  Application for Annulment, supra note 91, ¶ 224. 
 101.  Id. ¶ 226. 
 102.  Id. ¶ 154. 
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The threshold of ‘well below 2°C’ should not be 
misunderstood to be an entitlement for states to fully 
exploit the space up to 2°C.  It is a maximum limit that 
shall not be reached.  Rather, States shall pursue ‘efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C’. . . 
The Paris Agreement has not superseded the no-harm 
rule. The no-harm rule remains as a freestanding 
customary international obligation.  It follows that it may 
impose obligations further than those reflected in the 
Paris Agreement.103 
In this way, petitioners invoke the Paris Agreement temperature 
targets as informing an upper limit carbon budget beyond which 
country contributions would be in violation of the obligation not to 
cause transboundary harm.  
As customary international law, the obligation not to cause harm 
applies equally to all states, including the United States, unless the 
state has consistently objected to its application.104  The United States 
has not consistently objected.  Indeed, the genesis of the principle as 
noted above is the Trail Smelter Arbitration, in which the United 
States succeeded in holding Canada responsible for transboundary air 
pollution.105  In the United States, the principle is also viewed as 
entailing an obligation to take due care to avoid significant harm.  
According to the U.S. Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign 
Relations: 
1. A state is obligated to take such measures as may be 
necessary, to the extent practicable under the 
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its 
jurisdiction or control 
 
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules 
and standards for the prevention, reduction, and 
control of injury to the environment of another state or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and 
 
 
 
 
 103.  Id. ¶¶ 140–141. 
 104.  See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the 
Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457, 457 (1985). 
 105.  See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
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(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury 
to the environment of another state or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.106 
At least in the climate context, the Paris Agreement arguably 
qualifies as a “generally accepted international standard” that can 
inform the interpretation and application of the customary law.107  The  
obligation of due care thus arguably requires each country to take 
measures consistent with its equitable share of mitigation aimed at 
meeting the 2°C target. 
The Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement likely does not change this analysis significantly.  The 
United States is still subject to its customary law obligations, and the 
Paris Agreement’s temperature target remains a “generally accepted 
international standard” that provides a useful reference point for 
defining the obligation.  In fact, the withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement and the retrenchment on climate change policies likely 
strengthens the case that the United States has not met the ‘due care’ 
necessary to prevent the transboundary harm of climate change. 
VI. SIGNALING THE FUTURE REGULATION OF CARBON  
In addition to establishing an implicit carbon budget shaped by 
the temperature goals, the Paris Agreement also sent clear signals 
regarding the future regulation of carbon emissions.  Furthermore, the 
Agreement explicitly endorsed two other longer term goals:  (1) to 
reach a global peak of GHG emissions “as soon as possible” and (2) 
to achieve a goal of zero net emissions after 2050.108  Although non-
binding, the Parties established a plan for operationalizing these long-
term goals by inviting each Party to submit by 2020 “mid-century, 
long-term low GHG development strategies.”109  Through this explicit 
endorsement of a low-carbon future, the Parties signaled their resolve 
to move the world’s economy away from fossil fuels.   
Achieving the post-2050 no net GHGs goal does not, strictly 
speaking, require the elimination of fossil fuels, because enhancing 
carbon sinks or improving carbon capture technology could 
 
 106.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 601 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (emphasis added). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(1).   
 109.  Report of the Paris CoP, supra note 27, ¶ 35; see also Paris Agreement, supra note 
1, art. 4(19). 
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theoretically still allow for significant use of fossil fuels.110  
Nonetheless, the 2050 goal unequivocally builds momentum for a 
low-carbon energy future and a significant preference for renewable 
energy over fossil fuel sources.  Although we may not be able to 
predict our future energy mix, the Agreement suggests that fossil 
fuels will be significantly less important.  The Paris Agreement does 
not include any binding requirements for achieving the long-term 
vision, but it does provide a global policy framework that will guide 
everything from international advocacy campaigns against fossil 
fuels to national and subnational regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, to voluntary initiatives to reduce energy use.  Through 
these pathways, the Paris Agreement foretells a significant change in 
future energy usage.  The Paris Agreement’s clear signal of change in 
future energy markets potentially has a legal effect on at least two 
types of future cases:  those relating to the financial reporting of 
fossil fuel companies and challenges brought under investor-state 
dispute resolution systems by fossil fuel interests.111 
A. Financial Reporting and Stranded Assets 
The Paris Agreement reflected a global consensus in favor of a 
low carbon future, one in which carbon will be heavily regulated and 
highly priced.112  This presents a challenge to fossil fuel companies on 
how to value their assets, particularly oil, gas, and coal reserves that 
they expect to exploit in the future.113  If countries hold true to the 
Paris Agreement’s commitments, the future development of many of 
these reserves may be prohibited or prohibitively expensive—thus 
potentially creating stranded assets with little actual value.114  
Similarly, as carbon emissions are increasingly regulated, the costs of 
fossil fuel use will increase (either directly through a carbon tax or 
indirectly through requirements for emission reductions or carbon 
 
 110.  See, e.g., David Biello, Can Carbon Capture Technology Be Part of the Climate 
Solution?, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 8, 2014), https://e360.yale.edu/features/can_car 
bon_capture_technology_be_part_of_the_climate_solution. 
 111.  See infra text accompanying notes 112-131. 
 112.  Mark Schapiro, Oil Companies Quietly Prepare for a Future of Carbon Pricing, 
YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 23, 2014), https://e360.yale.edu/features/oil_companies_ 
quietly_prepare_for_a_future_of_carbon_pricing. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Sini Matikainen, What are stranded assets?, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE & THE ENV’T (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/what-
are-stranded-assets (noting that some of the causes of stranded assets include “new 
government regulations that limit the use of fossil fuels (like carbon pricing); a change in 
demand (for example, a shift towards renewable energy because of lower energy costs), or 
even legal action.”). 
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capture).115  Both the potential for declining value of stranded assets  
and the potential for increasing costs of carbon emissions present 
significant regulatory risks that, in turn, present challenges of 
financial disclosure for the fossil fuel industry.  
Failure to address these regulatory risks appropriately in 
financial disclosure statements could lead to significant legal 
liabilities.  In October 2018, the Attorney General of New York 
brought suit against ExxonMobil for allegedly “defrauding their 
shareholders by downplaying the expected risks of climate change to 
its business.”116  The Complaint alleges that Exxon misled investors 
in concluding that governments would not strictly regulate GHG 
emissions in accordance with a 2oC temperature scenario because the 
projected costs were simply too high.117  According to the complaint, 
“Exxon’s analysis of the costs associated with a two degree scenario 
was based on assumptions it knew to be unreasonable and 
unsupported by the sources upon which it purported to rely.”118  
Exxon also allegedly told investors it was managing the costs to its 
operations from future climate regulation, by consistently employing 
an escalating “proxy cost” of GHG emissions in its evaluations and 
projections of future operations.119  In reality, according to the 
Attorney General of New York, ExxonMobil did not consistently 
apply the proxy cost in evaluating their operations.120  As a result, the 
company was exposed “to greater risk from climate change 
regulation than what the investors were led to believe.”121  The 
Attorney General of Massachusetts has opened a similar investigation 
into Exxon, focusing on the company’s misrepresentations, both to 
consumers and to investors, “with respect to the impact of fossil fuels 
on climate change, and climate change-driven risks to Exxon’s 
business.”122 
 
 115.  See, e.g., James McAuley, France’s climate change commitments trigger rising 
diesel prices and street protests, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/world/frances-climate-change-commitments-trigger-rising-diesel-prices-and-
street-protests/2018/11/17/fdc01fa6-e9b1-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html. 
 116.  John Schwartz, New York Sues Exxon Mobil, Saying It Deceived Shareholders on 
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/clim 
ate/exxon-lawsuit-climate-change.html. 
 117.  Complaint at ¶¶ 286–297, New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed 
Oct. 24, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/summons_and_complaint_0.pdf.  
 118.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 119.  Id. ¶¶ 286–297. 
 120.  Id. ¶ 2-7. 
 121.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 122.  Attorney General’s Office Exxon Investigation, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/ 
lists/attorney-generals-office-exxon-investigation (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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Although the global discussion of a low-carbon future has been 
progressing for over three decades, it is arguably not clear when that 
discussion had coalesced to the point where global regulation of 
carbon presented a material risk that had to be disclosed.  Regardless 
of what the standard may be for past disclosure decisions, since the 
2015 Paris Agreement, carbon-intensive industries are on notice that 
they face significant regulatory risks going forward.  Litigation will 
be available to ensure proper financial disclosure of those risks.  
B.  Future Investor – State Disputes  
The Paris Agreement’s long-term goals also have implications 
for investor-state disputes going forward.  Under most multilateral 
and bilateral investment treaties, investors are given an opportunity to 
challenge national regulations they believe have severely affected 
their operations.123  These provisions are meant to protect foreign 
investors, who are often relying on thirty to forty years of revenue 
flows to recoup their initial capital investment, from unexpected 
efforts by host countries to expropriate their property.  Such 
protections are offered against both direct expropriations and indirect 
regulatory takings based on unexpected regulation of the investor’s 
property.124  Under most investment agreements, foreign investors can 
bring their claim to an international arbitration panel or a similar 
investor-state dispute system (ISDS).125   
The Paris Agreement’s long-term commitments put the fossil 
fuel industry and other emission-heavy industries on notice that 
carbon will be more heavily regulated in the future.  Thus notified, 
investors will be hard-pressed to argue that future regulations were 
unexpected or were intended to expropriate their property. 
A similar argument prevailed in a recent challenge brought by 
Philip Morris to Uruguay’s cigarette packaging regulation.126  In 
ruling for Uruguay, the arbitration panel relied partly on the clear 
signals of future regulation implicit in Uruguay’s participation in the  
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World Health Organization’s Convention on Tobacco Control.127  
After detailing the guidelines for packaging regulations under the 
Convention,128 the Tribunal held: 
Manufacturers and distributors of harmful products 
such as cigarettes can have no expectation that new 
and more onerous regulations will not be imposed… 
On the contrary, in light of widely accepted 
articulations of international concern for the harmful 
effect of tobacco, the expectation could only have 
been of progressively more stringent regulation of the 
sale and use of tobacco products.129  
Although significant differences exist between the Tobacco 
Convention and the Paris Agreement, the Paris Agreement is 
arguably an “articulation of international concern” for the harmful 
effects of fossil fuels.130  Like cigarette manufacturers, the fossil fuel 
industry’s expectations can now only be of “progressively more 
stringent regulation” of carbon.131  The signals from the Paris 
Agreement should be a strong impediment to investor claims that 
future regulations disadvantaging fossil fuel companies were 
unexpected or arbitrary. 
The Trump Administration’s withdrawal could blur the 
regulatory signal emanating from the Paris Agreement, but only to 
the extent it undermines the global consensus for stronger future 
regulation of fossil fuels.  Given that other countries have not 
reversed their support for the Paris Agreement, companies operating 
outside the United States should still expect host countries to enact 
increasingly ambitious NDCs under the Agreement over time.132  
When they do, investor challenges to regulations consistent with 
those NDCs will likely be dismissed.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the more than three years since its adoption, the Paris 
Agreement has begun to influence climate litigation in ways probably 
not fully contemplated by the negotiators.  The highly-scrutinized 
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compromise on the legal status of the NDCs resulted in a formally 
binding Agreement, but with language specifically designed to ensure 
the mitigation commitments were non-binding.  Nonetheless, many 
NDCs may be binding under national law and their adequacy may be 
subject to judicial review.133  In addition, the Paris Agreement 
provides a science-based, generally accepted global framework 
against which national courts can evaluate climate mitigation 
efforts,134 financial disclosures of climate risk,135 and investment-
backed expectations of future regulations.136   
The Paris Agreement’s temperature targets and mid- and long-
term mitigation goals, along with its principles and procedures for 
developing future NDCs, are providing an implicit carbon budget and 
framework for informing foreign courts’ deliberations regarding 
climate-related cases.  The framework is not providing a legal 
requirement, but it is providing the factual background from which 
courts calculate, for example, a country’s equitable share of climate 
mitigation efforts necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change 
impacts.  
The Paris Agreement’s role in shaping future litigation will not 
be significantly limited by the Trump Administration’s decision to 
withdraw, particularly as his lead is not being followed by other 
countries.  Most obviously, courts in other jurisdictions will not view 
one country’s politically motivated disavowal of the Agreement as 
undermining the general consensus that supports the mitigation 
approach taken at Paris.  Even in the United States, the withdrawal 
may not end the utility of the Agreement to litigators.  Just as in other 
jurisdictions, reliance on the Agreement may be based on its general 
affirmation of a scientifically based set of mitigation goals.  The legal 
basis for a claim in the United States may have to come from some 
other legal doctrine (just as it has in foreign jurisdictions), but the fact 
that a general consensus exists affirming the temperature and 
mitigation goals is not dependent on the United States maintaining its 
participation in the Agreement.  These aspects of the Agreement will 
continue to provide a valid framework within which a court can 
evaluate climate mitigation efforts, financial disclosures, and investor 
expectations, among other climate-related challenges. 
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